

PASS: Peace Agreement Strength Scores*

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December 16, 2020

Abstract

Scholars have long been interested in the strength of peace agreements, but conventional measurement practices are often subjective and endogenous to other post-conflict processes. I introduce an approach for measuring strength *ex ante* by relying on the content of agreements. I use this approach to develop the Peace Agreement Strength Scores (PASS). Drawing on three different datasets of peace agreements signed in civil conflicts, the scores capture the strength of peace agreements at the time of signing. By doing so, they can be used to avoid relying on the duration of agreement survival as a proxy for agreement strength. The scores are used to show descriptively that stronger peace agreements tend to be signed in more intractable conflicts, suggesting that a selection effect may be at play in the process of agreement signing and duration. The scores are available for all peace agreements signed in UCDP/PRIO civil conflicts from 1975-2018.

Word count: 8,878

The strength of peace agreements is an elusive concept that lies under the surface of much scholarship on conflict management and resolution. Numerous studies explore the relationship between specific provisions of peace agreements in civil conflict and the likelihood of renewed violence (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Werner and Yuen 2005; Matanock 2017; Reid 2017). Left unsaid in this research is that idea that if these provisions can make an agreement last longer, they also make that agreement stronger. Building on a conceptualization of peace agreement strength introduced by Fortna (2003), this manuscript introduces the Peace Agreement Strength Scores, PASS, a general measure of agreement strength for agreements signed in civil conflicts from 1975-2018. This measure allows scholars to investigate the relationship between a multitude of factors and agreement strength, as well as control for the overall strength of agreements when studying the relationship between specific provisions and post-conflict outcomes.

PASS offers multiple advantages over existing measures of peace agreement strength. Picking one or two theoretically motivated provisions ignores the influence of all other provisions and ignores the fact that some

*I thank Mike Kenwick, Jeff Carter, Marcella Morris, Guillermo Rosas, and Layna Mosley for helpful comments.

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provisions may be more relevant to some conflicts than others. Creating an additive index of agreement provisions as Werner and Yuen (2005) do assumes that all provisions contribute equally to agreement strength. Joshi and Quinn (2015) instead use an additive index of agreement provisions to capture the degree of reform involved in an agreement, but this makes the same assumption that all provisions entail an equal amount of reform to a post-conflict society.¹ Finally, Williams et al. (n.d.) employ a similar latent variable model but rely on conflict-level information that prevent their measure from being employed in any analysis involving the same conflict-level variables. PASS builds on this earlier work to deliver a nuanced and broadly-applicable measure of peace agreement strength that captures the strength of peace agreements at the time of signing.

The latent variable model PASS employs provides a single measure of peace agreement strength based on the characteristics of each agreement and allows direct comparison between different agreements. In addition, the model also offers insights into the relationship between individual provisions and the strength of agreements. In the same way that scholars of conflict management have begun to disaggregate power sharing to explore the effect of different provisions on agreement durability (Mattes and Savun 2009, 741), this approach facilitates investigating the individual impact of different provisions on agreement strength while accounting for their simultaneous presence or absence with other provisions. PASS draws on data from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006), PA-X (Bell and Badanjak 2019), and the Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015) to generate the scores.

PASS provides a comprehensive measure of peace agreement strength at the time of signing. It does so by relying only on information contained within the document itself. Statistically this means that the scores can be used in any regression analysis without concerns of endogeneity because they do not incorporate any information about the conflict external to the agreements themselves. This agreement-focused approach means that PASS can be employed in future research to try and isolate the independent effect of peace agreements as institutions, separating out the role of conflict-level factors.

¹The presence or absence of agreement provisions is encoded in binary form in peace agreement data, so a sum of provisions entails treating each provision as contributing equally to the final score because each provision has a numerical value of one.

1 Peace agreement strength

There is a long-running debate in international relations over whether institutions have an independent effect on behavior or are endogenous reflections of the underlying preferences of involved actors (Keohane 1988).² In the study of conflict management, this debate centers on whether peace agreements have an independent effect on the likelihood of conflict recurrence, or whether they are ephemeral “scraps of paper” whose apparent influence is driven by underlying forces (Fortna 2003). To enable PASS to assist with this inquiry, it only draws on the specific content of peace agreements and not any external factors.

Given the well-documented differences between conflicts fought over government and territory (Buhaug 2006; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009), including information on which type of conflict an agreement was signed in would likely generate a measure of agreement strength that has higher predictive accuracy than one that only includes information from the agreement itself. Such a strategy would account for unmeasured covariation between agreements in each type of conflict due to omitted variables. However, this measure would include both endogenous and exogenous aspects of peace agreements and would be useless for evaluating whether peace agreements have independent effect on post-conflict outcomes.

For this reason, PASS only includes information on the specific provisions within peace agreements as signed documents. As another example, agreements signed as part of mediation processes may be weaker due to a narrow-focused desire to achieve an agreement sooner at the expense of a stronger agreement (Svensson 2009; Williams et al., n.d.). However, including the presence or absence of mediation in PASS would mean that the scores would be unsuitable for any regression analysis that used mediation as a predictor. By only drawing on information contained within the text of peace agreements PASS can be used in any analysis involving peace agreements, whereas a measure that incorporated more general information about the conflict could not.

This discussion of the independent effect of peace agreements on phenomena such as conflict recurrence or public health outcomes in the aftermath of conflict implies that there is a causal effect of peace agreements on these outcomes. We wish to know how the outcome would change not only in the absence of an agreement, but also if the substance of that agreement were different while all other relevant factors remained

²For work in the area of IMF treaty compliance see Simmons (2000), von Stein (2005), and Simmons and Hopkins (2005); for work in the area of human rights treaty compliance see Hathaway (2002) and Simmons (2009).

constant. The concept of peace agreement strength in the conflict management literature is synonymous with this independent effect of agreements; an agreement that has a larger effect on the durability of peace is substantively stronger than one with a smaller impact. Fortna operationalizes the strength of a peace agreement as the “number and extent of the measures implemented as part of a cease-fire” (2003), suggesting that individual measures contribute to the effect of an agreement. Within this broad understanding of agreement strength, we can identify two clear categories of measures.

The first — “conflict resolution provisions” — are “stipulations in peace agreements aiming to resolve the basic incompatibilities” (Svensson 2007, 241). The provisions are intended to identify compromises that can prevent the return to hostilities in the future. Examples include power sharing arrangements to guarantee representation in legislative bodies to former rebel movements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) or the granting of regional autonomy in the wake of conflict (Cederman et al. 2015). If conflict resolution provisions aim to resolve fundamental incompatibilities underlying conflict, then agreements that contain more provisions should address more incompatibilities and reduce the incentive for renewed conflict in the future. In addition to addressing multidimensional grievances, multiple conflict resolution provisions can provide a form of redundancy whereby even if one fails, parties can turn to others to keep their rivals in check (Hartzell and Hoddie 2019, 643).

Conflict prevention provisions are smaller in scope and more narrowly focused on preventing the resumption of hostilities due to miscommunication or accident. International peacekeeping missions decrease the likelihood of renewed conflict after an agreement by reducing uncertainty through monitoring, raise the cost of returning to conflict, and can manage accidents to prevent them from escalating into renewed hostilities (Fortna 2008; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, n.d.). Other provisions, like transitional justice institutions, are explicitly designed to address the consequences of conflict and not the cause of the conflict. While power sharing arrangements function by addressing root causes of conflict, they are more effective when they actually see implementation (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). Efforts to ensure the full implementation of the stipulations of an agreement, such as detailed timelines or provisions for external review of post-conflict measures, are thus also conflict prevention provisions (Joshi and Quinn 2017). While these provisions do not address the root of the conflict, they have a similarly pacifying effect on

the likelihood of future conflict.

While each type of provision functions through different causal pathways, they both work to decrease the likelihood of renewed conflict. PASS relies on both types of provisions to generate a comprehensive measure of peace agreement strength. Both conflict resolution and prevention provisions are specific pieces of language within agreements that stipulate concrete actions that parties will take after the cessation of hostilities (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006).

2 The data

PASS employs the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset version 19.1 (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019), which contains information on the provisions contained in 324 unique peace agreements from 1975-2018.³ The data encompass both conflict resolution and conflict prevention provisions. Examples of conflict resolution provisions include power sharing and territorial autonomy arrangements, while disarmament and withdrawal of foreign forces number among the conflict prevention provisions. Table 1 presents all 28 provisions in the data.

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Ceasefire | Elections | Referendum | Prisoner Release |
| Military Integration | Interim Government | Local power Sharing | National Reconciliation |
| Disarmament | National Talks | Regional Development | Right of Return |
| Withdrawal | Power Sharing | Cultural Freedoms | Reaffirmation |
| Political Parties | Territorial Autonomy | Border Demarcation | Peacekeeping |
| Government Integration | Federalism | Local Governance | Gender Provisions |
| Civil service Integration | Independence | Amnesty for Rebels | Implementation Commission |

Table 1: Peace agreement provisions in the UCDP peace agreements data

All of these provisions are plausibly relevant to the strength of peace agreements, but it is unlikely that they all contribute equally to the strength of an agreement. PASS uses a measurement approach, detailed in Section 3, that incorporates all provisions, but uses patterns of co-occurrence to learn how individual provisions contribute differentially to agreement strength. This technique strikes a balance between relying on previously-published studies to identify a subset of agreements to select as indicators of strength, and creating an additive index of all provisions to capture strength.⁴

³Three agreements are signed to terminate multiple conflicts. The SI details how these agreements are handled.

⁴The outlining provision is omitted following exploratory analyses. See the Supplemental Information for full details.

One provision in particular warrants in-depth discussion. The implementation commission provision denotes whether an agreement stipulated a committee or commission to oversee the implementation of the agreement (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006). This variable is a provision included in the document, and is not a measure of any post-signing implementation activities or lack thereof. Accordingly, including it does not risk introducing post-treatment bias due to the endogeneity of any post-signing activities to the agreement itself and the negotiation process that produced the agreement. The degree of implementation realized in a post-conflict society has a large impact on the eventual duration of the peace (Joshi and Quinn 2017), so it is important to measure whether an agreement includes arrangements designed to facilitate full implementation in the future.

Inspecting the provisions in specific agreements can give some insight into the strength of the agreements.

Figure 1 presents provisions in four different agreements:

- The Lancaster House Agreement that ended the Rhodesian Bush War in 1979
- The comprehensive peace agreement between the government of Colombia and the FARC in 2016
- The Good Friday Agreement that ended the Troubles in 1998
- The Arusha Accords in the Rwandan Civil War in 1993




Figure 1: Provisions in various peace agreements.

The Lancaster House Agreement is one of only two agreements in the data with independence provisions, and the second longest surviving agreement in the data. The comprehensive Colombia 2016 agreement contains many post-conflict reconciliation provisions such as amnesty for former rebels, the release of prisoners, national reconciliation, and establishing a right of return for refugees and internally displaced

persons. The Good Friday Agreement has rather fewer provisions and ensures disarmament of former combatants, cultural freedoms, and the holding of a national referendum on the agreement. The Arusha Accords provided for the integration of former combatants into the civil service and military, power sharing agreements, and scheduled elections.

Each of these peace agreements is qualitatively different from the others. While all four mandate the disarmament of combatants and the release of prisoners, the differences between them are striking. The Arusha Accords focus strongly on political concessions to the Rwandan Patriotic Front while the comprehensive agreement in Colombia is oriented towards addressing the human costs of such a long-running conflict. These differences illustrate the fact that different provisions take different steps toward resolving incompatibilities or implement different mechanisms to address post-conflict commitment problems.

2.1 Additional data sources

While the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset includes a wealth of information on the content of peace agreements, it is not exhaustive and there are multiple conspicuous oversights. Many factors that have been found to have important effects on agreement survival, such as economic power sharing and detailed implementation frameworks, are absent from the data. To address these shortcomings, PASS incorporates information from two other sources of information on peace agreements.

PA-X includes much more detailed data at more disaggregated levels than the UCDP Peace Agreements Data and records 225 different quantitative dimensions of peace agreements (Bell and Badanjak 2019). PA-X includes two types of codings for agreement provisions. Binary variables note whether a given provision was included in the agreement or not, while categorical ones code a 0 for no mentions of a provision, 1 for rhetorical mentions, 2 for substantive provisions, and 3 for detailed provisions. Examples of provisions found in PA-X but not the UCDP Peace Agreement Data include the establishment of permanent electoral commissions and judicial accountability measures.

The Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM) tracks the implementation of 51 different provisions in comprehensive peace agreements over time (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). While the primary purpose of the dataset is to study factors that affect the eventual implementation of agreement provisions,

the data are necessarily also a source of information on provisions included in the agreement at the time of signing. Provisions that PAM tracks that are found in neither the the UCDP Peace Agreement Data nor PA-X include detailed implementation timelines and protocols for external review of agreements.⁵

PA-X and PAM include both conflict resolution and conflict prevention provisions that have been shown to reduce the likelihood of future conflict. Unsurprisingly, many of the provisions mirror those in the UCDP Peace Agreements Data. Examples of provisions found in PA-X that duplicate those contained in the UCDP Peace Agreements Data include refugees and internally displaced persons, which mimics the UCDP right of return provision, and border demarcation, which is found in all three datasets. The abundance of provisions and duplication problem requires selecting a subset of provisions from both datasets to include in PASS. I do this by selecting provisions that have been associated with increased agreement duration in the conflict resolution literature. This selection is presented in Table 2.

| Binary | | Categorical | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Arms Embargo | Civil Society | Ethnic Groups | Religious Groups |
| Implementation Timeline | Human Rights | Indigenous Groups | Institutional Reform |
| Dispute Resolution | Criminal Justice | Constitutional Renewal | Constitutional Reform |
| Implementation Support | Judiciary and Courts | Electoral Commission | Economic Powersharing |
| Ethnic Relations Council | Natural Resources | Protection Measures | Judicial Accountability |
| External Review | Land Reform | Transitional Justice | Vetting and Lustration |
| Verification Mechanism | Enforcement Mechanism | Reparations | |
| UN Authority | | | |

Table 2: Agreement-level covariates from Peace Accords Matrix (leftmost column) and PA-X (remaining columns)

Constraining power sharing institutions like independent judiciaries and guarantees of the protection civil liberties reduce the likelihood of both new and renewed conflict (Gates et al. 2016). PA-X includes multiple provisions that fall under this umbrella including judicial accountability and measures to protect specific groups. Disagreements over the distribution of natural resources can lead to conflict recurrence (Rustad and Binningsbø 2012), and PA-X provides data on both economic power sharing more broadly and natural resource arrangements specifically. Land reform can help prevent future conflict by addressing underlying inequalities and as part of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration for former combatants on both sides (Binningsbø and Rustad 2012), and is included in PA-X. Monitoring and verification are key to reducing

⁵The Power-Sharing Event Dataset (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015) tracks power sharing over time after an agreement is signed, but does not contain any provisions not already included in the existing datasets, so it is not used.

uncertainty about military capabilities on all sides, decreasing the likelihood of renewed conflict (Mattes and Savun 2010), and PAM notes whether an agreement contains provisions for verification mechanisms. The degree to which specified provisions are ultimately implemented has a large effect on the survival of an agreement (Joshi and Quinn 2017). PAM tracks the presence of a detailed implementation timeline and external donor support which both increase the likelihood of full implementation.

Due to data limitations discussed in Section 3, provisions from PA-X and PAM cannot be included in the model alongside the provisions presented in Table 1. Although they still add to the measure of an agreement's strength at the time of signing, they contribute less than the provisions from the UCDP Peace Agreement Data. While less than ideal, this compromise allows PASS to include theoretically-relevant information it would not otherwise be able to.

2.2 Why not include interstate wars?

While negotiated settlements occur in both interstate and civil wars, they have historically been rarer in civil wars (Pillar 1983) due to heightened commitment problems relative to interstate wars (Walter 1997), although their prevalence has waxed and waned over time in response to shifts in international norms around conflict resolution (Howard and Stark 2018). Negotiated settlements may similarly be less durable in civil wars (Walter 2002) due to the need to integrate former combatants into society (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). While conflict resolution provisions like power sharing and conflict prevention provisions such as enforcement mechanisms are strong predictors of agreement success or failure in civil war, they are not in interstate conflict (Werner 1999). Some mechanisms that affect the durability of peace are only applicable in one type of conflict: foreign imposed regime change greatly increases the duration of peace after interstate conflict (Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter 2008), but while externally imposed regime change is a plausible outcome in almost all interstate conflicts, it is not in intrastate conflict. For these reasons, it is not appropriate to pool peace agreements across types of conflict.

The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset contains only 31 peace agreements signed in international conflicts due to the rarity of interstate conflict during the sample period. Although PASS extends the approach introduced by Fortna (2003) to measure the strength of peace agreements in interstate conflict, this is too few

observations to generate estimates with meaningful variation in a model estimated on just interstate conflict. Due to the inability to pool interstate and intrastate conflicts or generate separate estimates for interstate conflict, PASS only measures agreements in civil conflict.

3 Measurement strategy

The strength of peace agreements is measured as a latent variable using the two parameter item response model (Rasch 1980). This approach models the provisions included in peace agreements as probabilistic functions of the latent strength of the agreement, with stronger agreements being more likely to exhibit provisions. The functional form of this relationship is assumed to be the logistic function, and the model is given by

$$\Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}[\gamma_j(\theta_i - \alpha_j)] \quad (1)$$

where i indexes agreements and j indexes provisions. θ_i is the latent strength of an agreement, and higher θ_i values are associated with a higher likelihood of observing a given $y_{ij} = 1$. However, this likelihood is not equal for all provisions and the remaining two parameters control the location and shape of the logistic curve for each provision. The difficulty parameter α_j serves as a baseline and reflects the probability of observing $y_{ij} = 1$ when θ_i is equal to the mean of the latent strength $\bar{\theta}$, which is also the value of θ_i at which there is an equal probability of observing $y_{ij} = 0$ or $y_{ij} = 1$. Lower values mean that an agreement need not be particularly strong for us to observe $y_{ij} = 1$. The discrimination parameter γ_j controls the slope of the logistic curve, which corresponds to how well a given provision discriminates between weak and strong agreements. When γ_j is low, the slope of the curve is low, and a shift in θ_i results in only a minimal change to $\Pr(y_{ij} = 1)$, so there is a large region of uncertainty about the strength of an agreement. In contrast, when α_j is high, the region of uncertainty is small, and only minimal changes in θ_i are needed to shift $\Pr(y_{ij} = 1)$ from ≈ 0 to ≈ 1 .

A high α value and a low γ would indicate a provision that is associated with strong agreements, but does a poor job separating stronger and weaker agreements. This means that overall agreements with this provision will be stronger, but that large increases in agreement strength only marginally increase the probability of observing that agreement. As observers not privy to the data generating process behind

real world data, a low γ_j estimate tells us that given two agreements with otherwise equal provisions, the agreement with $y_{ij} = 1$ may not actually be stronger than the agreement with $y_{ij} = 0$.

The prior mean of θ is defined as a linear combination of agreement-level covariates. The first is *agreement type* which denotes whether an agreement is a process, partial, or full agreement. Full agreements reflect attempts to settle the entire incompatibility in a conflict, partial ones address part of the incompatibility, while process agreements indicate merely “initiate a process to settle the incompatibility” (Harbom, Höglbladh, and Wallensteen 2006, 622). This variable is coded -1 for process agreements, 0 for partial agreements, and 1 for full agreements.

Ideally data from PA-X and PAM would be included in the provisions Y . Unfortunately, PA-X contains information on only 84.45% of the agreements in the UCDP Peace Agreements Data, and PAM only 9.15%. The missingness is higher than the conventionally accepted threshold of 15% for PA-X. PA-X begins in 1990 and PAM in 1989, while PAM only covers comprehensive peace agreements, meaning the data are missing not at random, so imputing missing data before including the PA-X and PAM provisions in Equation 1 is not appropriate (Little and Rubin 2002). Instead, I follow Carter and Smith Jr. (2019) and allow the additional provisions to inform the prior on θ alongside *agreement type*.

While it is possible to include additional conflict-level covariates such as the *incompatibility* under dispute or whether *ethnic* cleavages motivate the violence, this decision narrows the applicability of the resulting measure because it would not be suitable to use in an analysis including either of these variables on the other side of the regression equation. Another common approach to account for unmeasured variation across groups is to allow for differential item functioning, where the relationship (α, γ) between observed indicators (Y) and agreement strength (θ) varies by group. Doing so would introduce outside information into the measure, and is thus inappropriate.⁶ The full model with priors and hyperpriors is presented below:

⁶It also results in a lower classification accuracy than the model in Equation 1. See the SI for details.

$$\theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{X}\beta, 1) \quad (2)$$

$$\gamma \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_\gamma, \sigma_\gamma) \quad (3)$$

$$\alpha \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_\alpha, \sigma_\alpha) \quad (4)$$

$$\beta \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \quad (5)$$

$$\mu_\gamma, \mu_\alpha \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \quad (6)$$

$$\sigma_\alpha, \sigma_\gamma \sim \exp(1) \quad (7)$$

The agreement-level covariates (*agreement type* and provisions from PA-X and PAM) are included in Equation 2 as \mathbf{X} . This model is similar to the one in Williams et al. (n.d.), but with two key improvements. Their identification strategy uses a weak and a strong agreement to orient and scale the latent measurement of peace agreement strength and the rank of these anchor agreements in the range of latent strengths is highly unstable and subject to large shifts when different agreements are used as anchor points. Their model necessitates the inclusion of information about a number of conflict-level factors in civil war, such as economic sanctions or mediation attempts, meaning that their measure cannot be used to explore the independent effect of peace agreement strength. They also include a conflict-level random intercept which indirectly includes conflict-level information by sharing information between agreements signed in the same conflicts. Neither of these limitations apply to PASS, as it does not include any conflict-level information and employs a much more general identification strategy detailed below.

Williams et al. (n.d.) find that their measure is positively correlated with *agreement type*, and PASS leverages this relationship to identify the model. Constraining the coefficient on *agreement type* to be positive places weak and strong agreements on opposite sides of the likelihood surface, solving the reflection invariance problem and ensuring that strong agreements will have positive estimates and weak agreements negative ones (Bafumi et al. 2005, 176–79).

$$\beta_{\text{type}} > 0 \quad (8)$$

However, *agreement type* does not cleanly separate strong and weak agreements.⁷ The model thus includes a second identification restriction where the discrimination parameters are constrained to be positive under

⁷Using only *agreement type* as an identification restriction results in an unidentified model; see the Supplemental Information for details.

the assumption that the presence of a provision always signals a stronger agreement.⁸ Even if the targeted incompatibility for a provision is not present in a conflict, the inclusion of that provision should fail to increase the strength of an agreement, not decrease it.

$$\gamma > 0 \tag{9}$$

3.1 Model assessment

The identification restriction in Equation 8 needs to be evaluated to assess the suitability of the model.⁹ If *agreement type* is a good separator of strong and weak agreements, then the estimate for $\beta_{type} \gg 0$. The posterior mean for β_{type} is 0.81 with a 95% credible interval of [0.56, 1.07], so *agreement type* clearly serves to its purpose as an identification restriction.¹⁰ While all other β values are positive, only the 95% credible intervals for Criminal Justice/emergency law and NA exclude 0.

Figure 2 presents the posterior means and 95% credible intervals for the difficulty parameters α and the discrimination parameters γ . Higher (lower) difficulty parameters indicate provisions that are more (less) likely to appear in stronger (weaker) agreements. Difficulty parameters define a ‘baseline’ of strength that agreements must surpass for there to be a reasonable chance of observing that provision. Ceasefire provisions have an estimated α value of 0.09 and γ value of 1.1 so an agreement does not have to be particularly strong to exhibit a ceasefire provision, while the absence of a ceasefire provision tells us that an agreement is likely to be weak. There is a clear block of provisions including territorial autonomy, local power sharing, and independence referenda with higher difficulty parameters. This high difficulty makes sense given the finding that territorial conflicts are more difficult to peacefully resolve (Toft 2003). Additionally, territorial power sharing arrangements are a costly signal that indicates that governments are serious about securing peace (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Martin 2013), which fits with their higher difficulty parameter estimates.

There is also a clear block of provisions such as amnesty for rebels, prisoner release, and peacekeeping with lower difficulty parameters that is agnostic towards the incompatibility in a conflict. As this last group

⁸While this is sufficient to identify the model, convergence requires over 100,000 MCMC iterations. To aid with convergence μ_γ is also constrained to be > 0 .

⁹All results are from models with 4 chains run for 20,000 iterations with 15,000 warmup iterations. Inference is performed on the 5000 post-warmup iterations pooled across chains.

¹⁰Starting values for θ in the MCMC sampler are set to -3 for partial agreements, 0 for process agreements, and 3 for full agreements to speed up convergence of the chains. All other parameters are randomly initialized.

of provisions addresses the consequences of violence rather than underlying incompatibilities responsible for the outbreak of conflict in the first place, they will contribute less to the strength of an agreement. The low α estimates for these parameters reflect exactly this; an agreement does not have to be strong to have a high probability of containing these consequences-of-violence provisions




Figure 2: Posterior means and 95% credible intervals with prior means denoted by dotted lines

Just as the identification restriction on β_{type} appears justified, constraining $\gamma > 0$ is defensible because none of the credible intervals for γ in the right panel of Figure 2 approach 0. Figure 2 also provides evidence that the model draws on patterns of co-occurrence and does not simply treat less common provisions as indicative of stronger agreements. Despite gender provisions featuring in more agreements than electoral provisions (108 compared to 104), it has a higher estimated difficulty parameter (1.10) than electoral provisions (0.71). The fact that a more common provision can have a substantially higher difficulty parameter estimate indicates that the model is not simply using frequency as a way to judge the contribution of a provision.

The relationship between observed provisions and latent strength can be made clearer by examining the item characteristic curve (ICC) for specific provisions. The ICC for provision j is simply Equation 1 evaluated

across the range of $\hat{\theta}$ using $\hat{\alpha}_j$ and $\hat{\gamma}_j$. Figure 3 depicts the ICCs for elections and reaffirmation provisions, along with 95% posterior uncertainty, as well as observed values of y_{ij} for the provisions.¹¹




Figure 3: Item characteristic curves and observed provisions with 95% credible intervals

The ICC for elections is much steeper than for reaffirmation because while the observed instances of elections ($y_{ij} = 1$) and no elections ($y_{ij} = 0$) overlap, there is a clear space to the left where the weakest agreements do not contain election provisions with a similar gap to the right where none of the strongest agreements lack election provisions. In contrast, agreements across the range of θ both have and do not have reaffirmation provisions, so the slope of the ICC is much lower and it does not effectively discriminate between weak and strong agreements.

We can also qualitatively inspect the data to assess the convergent validity of the strength measure. Figure 4 presents provisions in the 10 strongest agreements, in comparison with the selected agreements in Figure 1. 25 agreements have zero provisions, but only 20 of these provision-less agreements appear in the 25 weakest agreements due to the added information from PA-X and PAM, which introduces additional variation.

All 10 of these agreements have ceasefire, disarmament, government integration, elections, power sharing, national reconciliation, right of return, and implementation provisions. Given the importance of ceasefires as necessary preconditions for peace, and the many ways in which power sharing works to bind former

¹¹See the Supplemental Information for similar plots for all 28 provisions.




Figure 4: Provisions in ten strongest peace agreements

combatants to peaceful cooperation, it is unsurprising that both of them are ubiquitous among the strongest agreements. The extremely low difficulty and relatively high discrimination of ceasefire provisions indicate that strong agreements have ceasefire provisions and weak ones do not, so if an agreement lacks a ceasefire provision we believe that it is weak, and we have high confidence in that belief. Similarly, power sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) and elections (Matanock 2017) are mechanisms to strengthen peace that have been extensively studied, so their pervasiveness among the strongest agreements is unsurprising.




Figure 5: Distribution of agreement strength measures with mean denoted by dashed line

Goertz (2009, 9–11) notes that in addition to qualitatively exploring extreme cases of a measure, we must also examine the *distribution* of cases at the extremes of the scale. A measure with high density at either extreme would suggest a scale that continues past the measured values and consequently cast doubt on the suitability of the measurement strategy. Figure 5 illustrates a moderate degree of positive skew with a short

tail of strong agreements, but not a high concentration of them, providing evidence of construct validity.¹²

4 Peace agreement strength scores

With the model validated, I now present the distribution of PASS. Figure 6 displays the posterior mean of each agreement's strength, as well as its 95% credible interval with the agreements described in Figure 1 labeled.




Figure 6: Distribution of agreement strengths with 95% credible intervals

Agreements near the top of the scale have the least uncertainty because they have the highest number of provisions, so the model has the most information on them. While there is considerable uncertainty around the estimates, many agreements are substantially different from one another as the 95% credible intervals do not overlap. Although there are 80 agreements with non-unique patterns of provisions in the UCDP Peace Agreement Data, 0 agreements have identical θ values due to the extra information contributed by PA-X and

¹²While the prior on θ is a normal distribution, the strength of the data is sufficient to generate an asymmetric distribution of agreement strengths, indicating that the strength estimates are not solely a product of the priors.

PAM.

Comparing the scores with existing measures of peace agreement strength allows us to evaluate their convergent validity; I do so by measuring the statistical association between PASS and an additive index of agreement provisions, which has been used to capture agreement strength (Werner and Yuen 2005). As an additive index is an ordinal variable, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is a better measure of association than the Pearson correlation coefficient. However, Spearman's ρ is biased in the presence of ties in one or more variables, and all but 2 values of an additive index have ties. The Kendall rank correlation coefficient τ_B corrects for ties and τ_B between an additive index and PASS is 0.83. This positive but not perfect correlation suggests that the extra information contained in the measurement model introduces substantial nuance into the strength scores.

Exploring where these measures disagree is instructive. Statistical associations between different measures can mask patterns of variation between them, especially when they agree on cases at the ends of the spectrum (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 133–36). Figure 7 plots the rank ordering of agreements under an additive agreement against the rank ordering under PASS, rather than the estimates themselves because the units of the latent scale are not inherently meaningful.

Agreement is high at the strong and weak ends of the spectrum, but decreases sharply towards the center. Importantly, this disagreement does not represent just a decrease in statistical efficiency where the ranking of similar agreements is switched. If this were the case, each cluster of points would be centered around the 45° line. Instead, we see that an additive index systematically underestimates the strength of agreements, most extremely in the middle of the spectrum.

5 Selection effects in agreement signing and duration

A direct measure of peace agreement strength allows us to investigate two potential confounding effects on the relationship between agreement content and duration. The first is the possibility of a selection effect where stronger agreements are signed at the conclusion of more intractable conflicts while the second concerns the potential for the strength to affect the degree of implementation its provisions receive. Both of these can confound the relationship between agreement strength and duration if not accounted for in




Figure 7: Rank ordering of agreement strengths measured by an additive index and PASS

analyses.

Strong selection effects characterize the presence or absence of specific provisions within peace agreements. Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) find that conflicts with higher levels of distrust among former combatants — those that lasted longer, were recurrent conflicts, or occurred in highly fractionalized societies — are more likely to generate peace agreements with multiple power sharing provisions. Similarly, Fortna (2008) finds that UN peacekeeping missions are most likely to be dispatched in the most difficult to resolve conflicts and Binningsbø and Rustad (2012) find that economic power sharing agreements are most likely to be implemented following conflicts fought over natural resources.

As an initial evaluation of the possibility that the strongest agreements are likewise signed in the toughest conflicts, I evaluate the relationship between multiple indicators of conflict intractability and agreement strength. Conflicts with many combatants take longer to resolve due to the increased number of veto players (Cunningham 2006), so civil wars that are listed as *internationalized* in the ACD may also have stronger

agreements due to the need to satisfy more stakeholders (Pettersson, Högladh, and Öberg 2019). Conflicts fought over identity can be some of the most difficult to resolve (Licklider 1995; Denny and Walter 2014), so I use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset to code whether a conflict is an *ethnic conflict* (Vogt et al. 2015). For both measures of conflict intractability, I fit models to three measures of agreement strength: agreement type, an additive index, and PASS. I also control for the *incompatibility* of the conflict and whether an agreement was signed during the *Cold War*, which would not be possible if conflict-level information such as *incompatibility* were included in the prior on θ . Table 3 presents results from these models.

| | Agreement Type | | Additive Index | | PASS | |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Internationalized | -0.14 (0.10) | | 1.58* (0.58) | | 0.36* (0.13) | |
| Ethnic Conflict | | -0.17 (0.11) | | 1.97* (0.59) | | 0.57* (0.14) |
| Incompatibility | -0.09 (0.09) | -0.13 (0.09) | 0.04 (0.48) | 0.53 (0.48) | 0.15 (0.11) | 0.28* (0.11) |
| Cold War | 0.33* (0.13) | 0.32* (0.13) | -1.95* (0.70) | -1.76* (0.70) | -0.51* (0.16) | -0.45* (0.16) |
| (Intercept) | 2.16* (0.15) | 2.36* (0.19) | 5.40* (0.85) | 3.10* (1.09) | -0.26 (0.20) | -0.93* (0.25) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.08 |
| RMSE | 0.67 | 0.67 | 3.77 | 3.75 | 0.87 | 0.86 |
| Num. obs. | 328 | 328 | 328 | 328 | 328 | 328 |

*p < 0.05

Table 3: Linear models of conflict severity and agreement strength

Across all three measures of agreement strength, the specifications with PASS as the outcome variable have the highest R² and the second-lowest root-mean-square error. The *internationalized* and *ethnic conflict* variables are positive and significant in these specifications, suggesting that stronger agreements are more likely in these less easily resolved conflicts. Ending during the *Cold War* is negatively and significantly associated with weaker agreements, which aligns with the finding by Hartzell & Hoddie that conflicts ending after the *Cold War* are more likely to implement multiple forms of power sharing (2015). Taken together these findings provide further evidence that PASS best captures the strength of peace agreement, and that harder to resolve conflicts are associated with stronger agreements.

A second possible confounding relationship between agreement strength and duration lies in the degree

to which the reforms contained in an agreement are actually implemented. If peace agreements are more than just “scraps of paper” and have an independent effect on post-conflict outcomes, it is likely through institutional mechanisms and not moral suasion alone. The level of implementation an agreement realizes would thus mediate the relationship between strength and survival, suggesting that we need to account for the level of legal sanction the a post-conflict reform can bring to bear in our analyses of peace duration.

To probe the plausibility of a relationship between the strength of an agreement and the degree of implementation it achieves, I use the aggregate implementation score for peace agreements from PAM (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). This score tracks how completely each of an agreement’s provisions have been implemented annually after signing. It ranges from 0 to a maximum value of 100, representing full implementation of all provisions in an agreement. The score reflects how fully the provisions in the agreement have been implemented, so two agreements with different numbers of provisions can both achieve a score of 100 if all of their provisions are fully implemented. I use the ultimate value of this score (recorded either at the time an agreement’s failure or the dataset’s end in 2015) as the outcome variable, and the measures of agreement strength in Table 3 as predictors. Agreements see increasing level of implementation over time, so I also include the number of *years post-signing* to account for this temporal trend. Other controls include *incompatibility* and factors that influence agreement strength identified in Table 3. Table 4 presents the results from these specifications.

The model that uses PASS has the best model fit, in terms of both R^2 and root-mean-square error. This specification is also the only one where the measure of agreement strength is statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of 13.26 represents a substantively meaningful relationship. Because the aggregate implementation score ranges from 0 to 100, this result is equivalent to a marginal effect of a 13 percentage point increase in implementation. As PAM only includes 30 agreements and excludes partial and process agreements, these results should be viewed critically.

Both sets of models provide evidence for the need to further study the intervening effect of agreement strength on post-conflict outcomes. Critically, they provide more than one path through which agreement strength can influence the trajectory of post-conflict societies. We need to investigate both whether more stubborn conflicts lead to stronger agreements, and how the strength of those agreements affects their degree

| | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Agreement Type | -10.90 (5.87) | | |
| Additive Index | | 1.69 (0.93) | |
| PASS | | | 13.26* (4.67) |
| Years Post-signing | 7.94* (1.89) | 7.99* (1.90) | 8.30* (1.76) |
| Internationalized | -2.90 (8.98) | -2.52 (9.03) | -1.34 (8.34) |
| Ethnic Conflict | -12.69 (12.87) | -19.97 (13.07) | -21.02 (12.00) |
| Incompatibility | 16.84* (6.95) | 13.23 (7.28) | 10.46 (6.83) |
| (Intercept) | -4.91 (28.79) | -21.96 (29.35) | -17.66 (26.59) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.44 | 0.43 | 0.52 |
| RMSE | 16.53 | 16.57 | 15.29 |
| Num. obs. | 30 | 30 | 30 |

*p < 0.05

Table 4: Linear models of agreement strength and ultimate implementation

of implementation.

6 Conclusion

PASS comes ready to employ in analyses of conflict and conflict resolution. The data contain conflict, year, and dyad identifiers compatible with the UCDP/PRIO ACD version 19.2 data. These scores allow researchers to comprehensively measure the strength of a peace agreement at the time of signing, in contrast to previous approaches that either rely on agreement duration as a rough proxy of strength, or employ only a handful of conflict resolution provisions to measure agreement strength. While the measure developed by Williams et al. (n.d.) resolves both of these issues, it depends on conflict-level information such as the presence of third-party mediators. This dependence precludes it from being used to analyze how the process by which an agreement is reached can affect its strength (Albin and Druckman 2012; Druckman and Wagner 2019), which PASS can do.

In contrast, PASS is able to identify a selection effect in the design of peace agreements and a potential intervening effect of agreement design on degree of implementation. While some studies of peace agreement

durability such as Hartzell and Hoddie (2015) account for this selection effect, many do not. This selection effect suggests that future studies of agreement durability should control for not only the strength of an agreement at time of signing, but also the process that affected the content of the agreement. Research on agreement implementation has tended to focus on the effect of implementation on post-conflict outcomes, but not the determinants of implementation. Doing so will likely shed light on the mechanisms by which post-conflict societies remain stable or return to widespread political violence.

PASS is negatively correlated with agreement duration ($\rho = -0.24$ among agreements that ended in failure), but a Cox proportional-hazards regression fails to find any statistically significant relationship between agreement strength and duration.¹³ One possible explanation is that stronger agreements are associated with a lower degree of ultimate implementation due to backlash from newly disadvantaged stakeholders. This would mean that any relationship between agreement strength at the time of signing and the ultimate fate of that agreement would be mediated by the intervening degree of implementation. Another alternative is that the more wide-ranging provisions associated with stronger agreements are more difficult to implement, and the failure of implementation could generate new grievances severe enough to overcome collective action problems and incite new conflicts in the future.

However, the preliminary findings in Section 5 contradict both of these potential explanations, as stronger agreements appear to be associated with higher levels of ultimate implementation. More research is needed to disentangle the relationship between *de jure* institutions embodied in agreement provisions and *de facto* practices after the conflict. In doing so, we will gain a better understanding of both affect post-conflict outcomes. Because PASS relies only on the actual content of peace agreements, it is ideally-suited to this goal. By using only information contained within agreements themselves, PASS provides a way to capture the independent effect of post-conflict institutions.

One downside to PASS is that it cannot account for the intent behind a provision's inclusion in an agreement. The data do not say whether a provision was a must-have protection demanded by one or more of the belligerents, or introduced by a third-party mediator. The former case should have a much larger impact on the strength of an agreement, but the model treats both equally.

¹³See SI for details.

Another limitation of the measure is that it only measures the strength of peace agreements signed after civil conflicts. Many of the institutions laid out in negotiated settlements can be implemented after the cessation of hostilities where conflict ended in either outright victory for one side or a prolonged period of low activity on the part of the rebels. This means that PASS cannot be used to address larger questions about the role of post-conflict institutions more broadly than those established as part of negotiated settlements. However, this shortcoming highlights a way forward in the study of peace agreements after civil war.

If scholars gather data on the presence or absence of the institutions stipulated in peace agreements in all post-conflict societies, then we will be able to answer whether including provisions for them in negotiated settlements increases their likelihood of being implemented. More importantly, this will assist scholars in isolating the independent effect of peace agreements on post-conflict stability. If stronger peace agreements are associated with a lower risk of renewed violence, even accounting for the implementation or not of specific provisions in all post-conflict societies, then that would suggest that the perceived effect of peace agreements is not endogenous. In the same manner that Gates et al. (2016) measure different forms of power sharing institutions in all societies, post-conflict or not, scholars should collect data on the implementation of the institutions outlined in peace agreements in the years following all civil conflicts, regardless of whether the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement, outright victory by one combatant, or a period of low activity. Doing so will allow us to isolate the independent effect of peace agreements on post-conflict stability, contributing rigor to the larger debate over the effect of institutions.

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